“[...] once the child is grown, he may look back and feel, ‘I would have preferred nonexistence.’”

In this letter to Since You Asked by Cary Tennis (Warning: Some foul language), a couple considers it wrong to have a child because any harm that comes to the child would then be their fault and the child may end up preferring non-existence. I doubt that they are actually trying to make (or looking for) a moral argument, but we do encounter something of the same kind of thought in a broader sense, namely, “Is it always better for a person to exist than not to exist?”

To the ancient (and Christian) mind, this question is absolutely absurd because existence is good. This is a self-evident principle, and it used to be recognized as such. Today, we’re a little more confused, but still no one can really deny that it is better to be than not to be. After all, how can not-being be good for the thing that is not? Existence is good, plain and simple.

In fact, existence is participation in God’s Being, which He is and which is his Goodness. God is, and God is Good. As they say, God’s essence and existence are identical. So, for God what he is and that he is are the same thing. Being itself cannot not be.

For creatures, however, essence and existence are not identical. I can to some degree talk about what a unicorn is, but there are, in fact, no unicorns. Still, a tree can exist at one time and then exist no more at another time. Since the existence of creatures is a priori dependent on God, he himself maintains their existence. Creatures have no existence on their own; it is always God who keeps them existing. This brings us back to the point: existence is always good. Being is good. Evil, in fact, is a lack of being. It’s the lack of a good that should be present, a corruption in the order of good beings.

Perhaps many of us are “still thinking that evil is a substance,” as Augustine says. Perhaps not quite. I think the problem is deeper. At least a dualist or a Manichee thinks that good and evil are real things. The question from Since You Asked betrays a graver fault: a doubt about the quality of goodness as a reality. In fact, the question is only following relativism to its quasi-logical conclusion. If I decide what is good and bad for me, then I can’t decide what is good and bad for others. If I can’t decide what is good and bad for others, then if another decides that it’s bad that he exists, it would be blameworthy for me to have contributed to his existence.

The question is perhaps a species of man’s basic question about morality: “What do I have to do?” This question depends on the answers of two others: “Where am I?” and “Where am I going?” In terms of morality, these questions are basically anthropological: What am I? What is my end? How do I achieve my end? These questions presume the goodness of existence. It makes no sense for the end (purpose, goal) of human existence to be in any way non-existence. This would not be an end at all because it would, in fact, be the annihilation of the I.

If being ain’t good, ain’t nothing good.

Though it’s doubtful that medieval angelologists ever debated about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, but, as Peter Kreeft says, “It’s a good question.”

Let’s look at this problem more closely.

What is an angel?

An angel is a “separated substance” other than a human soul after death but before the resurrection of the body, that is, an angel is a pure spirit. He is not a soul because he is not meant to inform a body. An angel is a substantial form with no matter of any kind. His essence and existence are not identical, that is, he is not God but rather a creature.

What, then, does it mean for an angel to be in a place?

Since an angel is a spirit, he is not in a place as bodies are in a place. A body is necessarily accidentally in a place by virtue of what it is to be a body. A spirit, however, has no matter and cannot be in a place accidentally as a body is. When we say that a spirit is in a place, we mean that he contains that place by his power. He does not circumscribe a place as would a larger body in space. Rather, for an angel, to be in a place means to be effecting change¹ in bodies in space. If a spirit is effecting some change on a body which is in a place, the spirit can be said to be in that place.

An Angel of the Lord descended at certain times into the pond and the water was moved. And he that went down first into the pond after the motion of the water, was made whole, of whatsoever infirmity he lay under. (John 5:4)

How does an angel come to be in a place?

An angel comes to be in a place (in the sense of containing it by his power, that is, acting on bodies which are in a place) at will. Thus, an angel does not cease to be in one place by local motion from it to another place. Rather, by a movement of the will from acting on one place to acting on another, the angel ceases to be in one place and begins to be in another.

And Habacuc said: Lord, I never saw Babylon, nor do I know the den. And the Angel of the Lord took him by the top of his head, and carried him by the hair of his head, and set him in Babylon over the den in the force of his spirit. And Habacuc cried saying: O Daniel, thou servant of God, take the dinner that God hath sent thee…. And Daniel arose and ate. And the Angel of the Lord presently set Habacuc again in his own place. (Daniel 14:35-38)

Can more than one angel be in the same place at the same time?

As we said above, for an angel to be in a place means to be effecting a change in a body in that place. The angelic power, too, is such that it effects these changes in bodies perfectly. Two men may cooperate as imperfect causes to cause a single movement in a body. For instance, to push a heavy car two or more men may cooperate, but there is a single movement in the car. This is due to an imperfection of power on the part of each man. An angel does not have this imperfection because he is of a higher order altogether. Therefore, his power to influence bodies is of a different kind not only of a different degree than the power of corporeal creatures. An angel does not effect a change matter by coming into bodily contact with it but by his will alone. Moreover, an angel does not assert his power in varying degrees. Every operation of his is perfect according to his faculties. Therefore, two angels cannot cooperate in moving a body because there cannot be two perfect (secondary) causes of the same movement.

Conclusion

To dance on the head of a pin clearly requires presence on the head of said pin. For an angel, this presence means to be effecting a change in the head of the pin itself or in a body on the head of the pin (e.g., air or other particles). The latter seems to be the more probable opinion.

If an angel were to effect a change (even an imperceptible one) in the head of the pin itself, other angels would be precluded (not as a body precludes other bodies from sharing the same place through the impenatrableness of its dimensive quantity extended in space but due to a potential confusion of causes) from effecting a change in the same body. Therefore, in that case, only one angel would be able to dance on the head of the pin.

If the head of the pin is not treated as a single body but rather as a collection of atoms or even subatomic particles, then the case is equivalent to effecting local motion in particles on the head of the pin.

If it is a question of effecting changes in the particles located on the head of the pin, then the number of angels would have an maximum equal to the number of particles present on the head of the pin. Undoubtedly, other angels could move more particles onto the head of the pin for the sake of effecting changes in them. Therefore, a maximum number of angels is established at the maximum number of particles that could be present on the head of the same pin.

Therefore, presuming strictly contemporaneous dancing (though angels could change places so quickly that we could not possibly notice), the number of angels who could dance on the head of the pin is limited to the lesser of two numbers: the maximum number of particles that could be present on the head of the pin and the difference between the total number of angels and the number of angels occupied in places other than the pin.

Or:

A = min((Maximum Number of Particles on the Head of the Pin), (Total Number of Angels - Number of Otherwise Occupied Angels))

This is the maximum number. Obviously, in practice, if an angel were to exert his power over all the particles on the head of a pin simultaneously, all other angels would be precluded from presence there.

1 An angel cannot effect every kind of change in a body since he cannot immediately give a form to matter nor effect a substantial change. He can, however, effect local motion in matter immediately because this does not cause an intrinsic change but only an extrinsic change of place in the body thus moved. An angel can indirectly cause different kinds of changes than local motion in bodies by using other bodies. “Dancing,” however, here is taken to mean effecting local motion in a body whereby the angel is said to be in one place and then another.

I had a discussion with some of my fellow seminarians the other day about so-called Eucharistic miracles. I do not like the term “Eucharistic miracle” because it seems to me to imply that the Eucharist is not always miraculous. It could be argued that this term merely means “a miracle involving the Eucharist.” However, the Eucharist itself even after transubstantiation is miraculous since the accidents of bread and wine persist without a substance.

I then put forth the idea that Eucharistic miracles, that is, when for instance the Host takes on the appearance of flesh, are actually less miraculous than the Eucharist as we normally experience it.

Here comes the metaphysics (the Eucharist as we ordinarily experience it):

1. The bread and wine cease to exist because God no longer maintains their existence. Not miraculous.
2. The substance of the whole Christ becomes present. Miraculous.
3. The accidents of bread and wine persist without substances. Miraculous.

And (the Eucharist in the case of Eucharistic miracles):

1. The bread and wine cease to exist because God no longer maintains their existence. Not miraculous.
2. The substance of the whole Christ becomes present. Miraculous.
3. The accidents of bread and wine do not persist without substances. Not Miraculous.

The question, then: Is it that the accidents of Christ become present, that is, the accidents of his risen body, or is it that by another miracle God makes present some other accidents such as of flesh or blood but not those that properly belong to Christ himself?

If the accidents of Christ himself become present in the case of Eucharistic miracles, then one fewer miracle has been performed by God than he usually performs in our experience of the Eucharist.

There was a discussion today at http://forums.catholic.com/showthread.php?t=127250 about “what you would do if you discovered that there is no God.”

It’s not possible to imagine discovering that there is no God.

1. To discover something means to come to a knowledge of its existence.
1. For example, a sailor lands on an island that he had not known existed. He has discovered the island.
2. This must be accurate knowledge.
1. For example, a physicist thinks he has discovered a new particle, but it turns out to be a particle that he already knew about. He has not discovered a new particle.
3. God exists.
4. To discover that God does not exist is impossible since God does exist.
5. However, we are talking about imagining discovering that God does not exist.
6. To imagine something, the object of our imagination must not necessarily be real but must have real properties.
1. Especially, the object of our imagination must be coherent.
2. For example, you can’t imagine a thing not being identical with itself or two and two adding up to five.
7. God is the necessary being. This means that God has to exist. Nothing else has to exist, but God does have to.
1. Everything thing else that exists owes its existence to God who is the source of Being.
8. Therefore, discovering that God does not exist would be discovering that nothing is. This would not be a discovery at all since there would be nothing to discover and no one to discover it.
9. Therefore, to discover that God does not exist is not a coherent idea.
10. Therefore, it is impossible to imagine discovering that God does not exist.

The question quite clearly should have been “what if you didn’t believe in God?” instead of “what if you discovered there were no God?” I take things too literally most of the time. It’s probably because of all that philosophy.

Argument:

1. God is that than which nothing greater can be thought.
2. Something which exists is greater than something which does not exist, de facto.
3. Therefore, God exists.

Objections:

1. There is an equivocation of ‘being greater in imagination’ with ‘being greater in reality’
1. Thus, if God is that than which nothing greater can be thought, then God must only be thought of as existing. This means that God’s existence need only be in the imagination and not necessarily in objective reality.

Argument:

1. Left to chance, it is very unlikely that the universe would have developed in the exact way necessary to sustain human life as it is.
2. The universe has developed in such a way.
3. Therefore, the development of the universe was not left up to chance.
4. Therefore, the universe had a designer.
5. God is this designer.
6. Therefore, God exists.

Objections:

1. Left to chance, all possible universes have an equal probability of existing.
1. Thus, the universe that has developed in such a way as to sustain human life is just as probable as any other possible universe.
2. Keeping in mind the vast size of the universe and the great amount of time that it has existed, it is far too anthropocentric to think of the conditions for human life as a criterion that holds such sway over the entire cosmos.
3. If there is a very large number of possible universes existing simultaneously (cf. the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics), then the universes that allow human life simply exist along with all others and are not special in an objective sense.
4. The Argument from Design is insidiously anthropocentric. It purports to make a crucial claim about objective reality based on the human experience of order and disorder.
1. It observes that human beings have the experience of building and designing things to function in a particular way.
2. It then observes that the universe functions in a particular way (that allows human existence).
3. It concludes, then, that the universe must have been designed just as human artifacts have been designed.
5. The Argument from Design attempts to make a crucial objective claim by subjective means.
1. Consider a lottery. Each possible universe corresponds one combination of numbers.
2. All combinations of numbers have the same probability.
1. Objection: Not all universes may be equally likely.
1. Response: Then this universe is simply the one that exists. Perhaps because it is more likely than others. Perhaps not.
3. One combination of numbers is drawn.
4. Objectively, there is nothing ’special’ about this combination.
5. Subjectively, however, (e.g. to a ticket-holder) this combination may seem very important.
6. It is absurd, though, to think that because a person holds a winning ticket the lottery is not random, even considering how improbable it is for any particular ticket to win.
6. The universe simply exists as it does. If it did not sustain human life than human beings would not be around arguing for the viability of atheism. If the universe were some other way, then it would simply be some other way. There is absolutely no need to posit God on account of this.

Relativism today is quite widespread. It can be quite subtle, as well. Even common parlance has taken on such characteristics. When was the last time you found yourself adding disclaimers everywhere such as: “Well, that’s just my opinion.” Why is it taboo to make judgments? I’m not saying that we can always make accurate judgments in areas such as moral culpability. But, why are we afraid to judge practices objectively, to evaluate whether claims are true? The presumption must be that there is no objective reality or that we cannot have certain knowledge of objective reality and that this precludes judgment.

Arguing with someone who really believes in Relativism will fail.

Here’s why:

1. In order to argue, we must use language.
2. The use of language presumes that there is at least a consensus on the meaning of words.
1. Already, it could be argued that a true Relativist will not assume that we are using words to mean the same thing that he means when he uses them.
3. Functionally, the purpose of language is to inform others.
1. Look at it evolutionarily. The better-informed survive because accurate knowledge is superior to inaccurate knowledge (if it can even be called knowledge).
1. Learning from one’s own experience is good. Learning from many’s experiences is even better.
2. Thus, language is a tool for spreading accurate knowledge and increasing man’s total wealth of accurate knowledge.
2. Decisions that are made while considering the actual state of reality will be more beneficial than those made while considering a fictitious state of reality.
3. The very fact that human beings use language constantly is evidence that there is a fundamental acceptance in human nature of the existence of objective reality. It is also evident that human beings constantly operate under the assumption that they can really make judgements about reality.
1. However, this may be the same is-ought problem that is used to critique Relativism. Just because people operate this way doesn’t make it right or accurate.
1. However, the point is not that this is the best way to operate it is merely that a true Relativist would never presume to make consistent judgments about the state of reality. Thus, he must decline any practical use of language.
4. Keeping in mind that accurate knowledge is better than inaccurate “knowledge,” it is clear that if the purpose of language is to inform others accurately of the state of reality, then a Relativist has no use for language because he denies the very existence of an objective state of reality.
1. Not all Relativists will deny outright an objective state of reality. Moral Relativists, for instance, may consider denying the validity of universal moral claims while still respecting the validity of universal scientific claims, for instance.
1. However, if there is an objective state of reality, and if human beings exist in this state, and if morality is concerned with the outcome of actions at all, then it follows that in any given situation there is one best or several good courses of action because the outcome of actions depends upon the state of reality in which human beings exist.
1. Of course, Kant would reject the ethics of Consequentialism presented here. He, however, presents an even more binding ethics which makes bold universal claims.
2. Accurate knowledge may not be better than inaccurate knowledge. For example, it may be better for a robber who asks whether there is anyone else in the house and plans to kill those who are in the house not to have accurate knowledge about whether anyone else is in the house.
1. However, in cases like this, the larger picture must be taken into account. If the robber had had accurate knowledge his entire life, then he would not have taken up robbing in the first place because he would have realized that it was not the best course of action.
3. Consider Existentialism, Skepticism, or Nihilism. These may all question the presumptions about the purpose of language or its use as evidence of a fundamental anti-Relativism in human nature.
1. If words do not have objective referents, referents determined by consensus, or even at a minimum referents by fuzzy association, then we can never be sure what we are talking about except intrapersonally. Thus, there is really no point in having a conversation with anyone.
1. Anyone who makes a presumption that there is no objective reality or that we cannot judge it accurately in even a passable or barely useful way has no need of language.
1. That same person could insist on using language just because he wanted to without any real purpose. This position would fit in nicely with Nihilism.
1. In that case, why bother listening? There wouldn’t be a real point either way.
5. If a Relativist cannot use language for a real purpose (especially a purpose such as persuasion), then it is utterly pointless to argue with him.
1. A true Relativist would believe it impossible to persuade another human being to his side. Indeed, would he even want to?
1. A simpler and more cliche way of saying this is to point out that it is an objective claim to deny the validity of objective claims. Voila! Instant paradox.

God has perfect knowledge of real future events. It seems like it should be intuitive, at least to Catholics, right? Yet, I’ve actually had to argue this one before!

1. God is perfectly simple.
2. Therefore, all attributes of God are identified with God’s essence.
1. To say that they are not identical is to say that God has parts.
2. Therefore, all attributes of God are identical.
1. This is to say that despite our use of different words, God’s justice is identical with his mercy and so forth.
3. In God there is no transition from potentiality to actuality.
1. This basically means that God does not change.
4. Therefore, in God’s attributes there is no transition from potentiality to actuality.
1. Therefore, every attribute that God has, he has in perfection.
5. Therefore, in God’s knowledge, there can be no transition from potentiality to actuality.
1. That is, God’s knowledge cannot change.
6. If God has perfect knowledge of all real present events, then God must have perfect knowledge of all real future events.
1. To say that God does not have perfect knowledge of all real future events but that after the fact of their occurrence he would have perfect knowledge of them, would be to say that God’s knowledge improves, that is, changes.
1. Objection: It could be argued that God has knowledge of all real present events but that even after the fact of the occurrence of some future event he would not have knowledge of it.
1. Reply: This would be to say that at some point in the future, God would not have perfect knowledge even of all real present events. This confuses the fact that the future becomes the present by means of a transition from potentiality to actuality. It would also mean that God is God only for a single instant and at no other time.
7. God does have perfect knowledge of all real present events.
8. Therefore, God has perfect knowledge of all real future events.

This should also be obvious because the distinctions among past, present, and future are not binding on God.